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Abstract
A social dilemma appears when defection is individually favored than co-
operation although the latter is collectively optimal. A class of successful
strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma [Yi et al., J. Theor. Biol. (2017)] and for the three-person iterated
public goods game [Murase and Baek, J. Theor. Biol. (2018)]. A successful
strategy forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of implemen-
tation error while assuring that the long-term payoff never becomes less than
the co-players’ regardless of their strategies, when the error rate is small.
Although we have a list of actions prescribed by the successful strategies,
the rationale behind them have not been fully understood. In this paper,
we wish to provide a better understanding for the successful strategies by
converting them into equivalent automata with a minimal number of states.
Each of the states becomes interpretable in this representation, whereby one
can gain insight into the underlying mechanism.
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1. Introduction
George Berkeley says that a man who believes in no future state has
no reason to postpone his own private interest or pleasure to doing his
duty (Chalmers, 2008). Reciprocity is one way to establish cooperation
between rational individuals under this shadow of future (Nowak, 2006;
Sigmund, 2010; Van Veelen et al., 2012). Tit-for-tat (TFT) is one of the
most popular reciprocal strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
game (Axelrod, 1984). Just by replicating the co-player’s previous action,
it embodies several, intuitively appealing properties, that is, being clear,
nice, provokable, and forgiving. However, in the presence of implementa-
tion error, two TFT players easily run into TFT retaliation (Molander, 1985;
Boyd, 1989), so the long-run average payoff becomes as low as those between
two RANDOM players, where a RANDOM strategy means choosing coop-
eration with probability 1/2. Moreover, a TFT population is invaded by
unconditional cooperators because a TFT player cannot distinguish an un-
conditional cooperator from another TFT player. Generous TFT has been
suggested to avoid the TFT retaliation (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992; Imhof
et al., 2005, 2007; Imhof and Nowak, 2009), but it is outperformed by Win-
Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) (Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund,
1993). WSLS also solves the problem of distinguishability in the sense that
it earns a strictly higher average payoff against an unconditional cooperator.
However, it is vulnerable against unconditional defectors.
A notable progress in the iterated PD game is the discovery of the zero-
determinant (ZD) strategies (Press and Dyson, 2012). Each of them is a
memory-one strategy, generally stochastic, and it can enforce a certain linear
relationship between its own payoff and co-players’ payoffs irrespective of
the co-player’s strategy Ichinose and Masuda (2018); Mamiya and Ichinose
(2019). This is true even when the co-player has a longer memory or when
the strategy is known to the others. When both the players attempt to
extort each other using an extortionate ZD strategy, they end up with mutual
defection, so an extortionate strategy is hard to evolve as a group (Hilbe
et al., 2013a; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013; Hilbe et al., 2013b; Szolnoki and
Perc, 2014). TFT is a special case of the ZD strategies, equalizing the players’
payoffs in the long run.
An even stronger class of strategies have been explored in Yi et al. (2017).
They have proposed a strategy called TFT-anti-TFT (TFT-ATFT), which
can be understood as a modification of TFT. It has been devised to remedy
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the problems of TFT by satisfying the following three criteria:
1. Efficiency: If all the players in the game have adopted this strategy in
common, they will reach mutual cooperation with probability one as
the implementation error rate e approaches zero.
2. Defensibility: If the focal player uses this strategy, her expected payoff
is greater than or equal to any of her co-players’ regardless of their
strategies.
3. Distinguishability: If all the co-players are unconditional cooperators,
the expected payoff from this strategy is strictly higher than theirs.
The class of strategies satisfying these three criteria are called successful here-
after. The first two criteria are especially important because a cooperative
Nash equilibrium is formed when efficiency and defensibility conditions are
simultaneously satisfied (Yi et al., 2017). Moreover, it is guaranteed that
the focal player’s long-term payoff is never be less than those of the others
against any kind of strategies including irrational ones. Just as is the case
for the ZD strategies, this relation is assured even when the co-players have
a longer memory length or when they know the focal player’s deterministic
strategy. TFT-ATFT is a memory-two strategy, namely, it prescribes its
next action depending on the history profile for previous two rounds. As
indicated by the name, it is a combination of TFT and anti-TFT: It usually
copies its co-player’s action at the last round as if it is a TFT player while
it takes the opposite actions when the focal player committed an error. Due
to the “plan B”, which is executed after its own error, mutual cooperation is
tolerant against error while assuring the defensibility. Regarding efficiency,
we mention that perception error can also be corrected if it occurs with a
much longer time scale than implementation errors (Yi et al., 2017).
Successful strategies exist not only for the iterated PD game but also for
an iterated public goods (PG) game (Boyd and Richerson, 1988). The payoff
matrix of the three-person PG game is given as follows:
M ≡
 0 1 2C ρ 2
3
ρ 1
3
ρ
D 1 + 2
3
ρ 1 + 1
3
ρ 1
 , (1)
where the number of defectors among the two co-players is written at the top
of each column , and ρ is a multiplication factor satisfying 1 < ρ < 3. This is
a generalization of the iterated PD game to a three-person case. As in the PD
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game, the only Nash equilibrium of the one-shot PG game is full defection
with payoff MD,2 = 1, which is the worst for the society as a whole. For
the iterated three-person PG game, it has been found that there are at least
256 successful strategies in the memory-three strategy space (Murase and
Baek, 2018) and that there is no such strategy if the memory length is less
than three. This fact immediately poses a problem on its understandability:
Recall that a memory-three strategy is defined by an action table having 512
entries because the number of possible history profiles is 23×3 = 512.
The purpose of this paper is to interpret the successful strategies by rep-
resenting them as equivalent automata. In the previous works, we have
represented successful strategies in a “history-based” manner so that the
next action is given as a function of the history profile for the last m rounds.
However, a strategy may also be defined as an automaton (Rubinstein, 1986),
i.e., a player has a finite number of internal states. A player’s internal state
determines her next action, and it changes according to the actions taken by
the players of the game. We will show that the decision mechanism behind
the actions prescribed by the strategy can be understood more clearly in this
‘state-based’ representation.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present an al-
gorithm to convert a history-based representation to a state-based one, and
its applications to some successful strategies are demonstrated in Section 3.
We discuss possible interpretations for the resulting internal states and sum-
marize this work in the last section.
2. Method
In this section, we show how a history-based strategy can be converted
to a state-based representation. In general, history-based strategies may be
regarded as a subset of state-based ones because one may also regard the
history profile over the previous m rounds as an internal state. In this naive
reinterpretation, the number of states (i.e., history profiles) would amount
to 2nm, where n is the number of players. Let us consider a directed graph
with 2nm nodes, in which each node denotes a distinct history profile and
each link means a transition between a pair of states. Each node has 2n−1
outgoing links, corresponding to the possible number of actions taken by the
n − 1 co-players, because the focal player’s action has already been fixed
by the strategy under consideration. Note that this graph does not include
transitions caused by implementation error.
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An example of such a graph is shown in Fig. 1(a). Because TFT is a
memory-one strategy for a two-players game, it has four nodes, labeled by
cc, cd, dc, and dd, respectively. Suppose that the current history profile is
cc. For example, if the two players’ last actions are c and d, respectively,
the next history profile becomes cd. In case of TFT, the action tuples such
as cd, denoted as link attributes, happen to look similar to node labels, but
this is not the case for general memory-m strategies if m > 1. Although
this representation fully define the strategy, it is redundant. For instance,
it is obvious that TFT can also be represented by a graph with two states
as shown in Fig. 1(b). In case of TFT, it is straightforward to construct
the graph in Fig. 1(b) based on Fig. 1(a). However, it suddenly becomes
complicated when the memory length gets longer because the number of
nodes grows exponentially.
Thus, the question is how to simplify a naive representation systemati-
cally by minimizing the number of states. This is known as deterministic-
finite-automaton (DFA) minimization in automata theory (Moore, 1956).
Specifically, we use the following algorithm:
1. Split given states into two partitions P0. Each of them consists of states
at which c and d are prescribed, respectively.
2. Initialize k = 0.
3. Increment k. For each partitions in Pk−1, divide them into a finer set of
partitions Pk if a pair of nodes i and j are not equivalent. Here, nodes
i and j are equivalent if the outgoing links from these nodes go to the
same partition in Pk−1 for any input. In our context, an input means
an action tuple of the co-players. (see Fig. 2.)
4. Repeat step 3 until Pk becomes identical to Pk−1.
In short, we regard two states as identical when they lead to the same future.
The final result is uniquely determined irrespective of the order of choosing
node pairs. If we apply this algorithm to Fig. 1(a) for instance, it ends up with
two super-nodes {cc, dc} and {cd, dd}, yielding the graph shown in Fig. 1(b)
as expected. The opposite conversion is not always possible. For example,
one needs an infinitely long memory to describe the behavior of Contrite
TFT (CTFT) (Sugden, 1986) in the history-based representation (Boerlijst
et al., 1997), whereas its state-based version needs only four states [Fig. 1(c)].
Figure 3 shows some other examples of the DFA minimization. It greatly
simplifies the graphs, especially when the memory length is long.
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Figure 1: (a) Transition among history profiles of TFT. Each node is labeled by a history
file, which is a 2-tuple composed of the last actions of the two players in this memory-
one strategy. A history profile may also be regarded as an internal state of the focal
player in this naive representation. Each node has two outgoing links because it has two
possible destinations depending on the co-player’s choice between c and d. (b) State-based
representation of TFT with two two internal states. If the co-player cooperates (defects),
the internal state becomes 1(0), and the focal player chooses an action based on this
state. The color of each node indicates the action prescribed at each state: Blue and red
mean cooperation and defection, respectively. (c) Graph representation of CTFT, one of
the most well-known strategies based on internal states called standing. Each player’s
standing is either good (0) or bad (1) from the focal player’s viewpoint. For example,
‘10’ means that the focal player assigns good standing to herself and bad standing to her
co-player.
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Figure 2: DFA minimization. Nodes i, j, and k should be split into two partitions, {i, j}
and {k}, because i and j lead to the same future via either cc or cd, whereas k responds
differently.
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Figure 3: Conversion of history-based representation to state-based one. An example
is Tit-for-Two-Tats (TF2T) before and after the DFA minimization (left). The second
example on the right hand is AON2, the ‘all-or-none’ strategy for the PG game among
memory-two players, proposed by Hilbe et al. (2017). Each of these strategies, which
generally has 16 nodes as a memory-two strategy, is reduced to an automaton with three
internal states by the DFA minimization. As in Fig. 1, blue (red) means that the player
should cooperate (defect) at the state. We have suppressed the action tuples assigned to
the links in the history-based representation for better visibility.
3. Result
3.1. Iterated PD game
Let us consider the iterated PD game between two players, say, Alice
and Bob. We assume that Alice has adopted TFT-ATFT, and its history-
based representation is shown in Fig. 4(a). The label of each node is the
history profile by Alice and Bob over the two previous rounds, denoted as
At−2At−1Bt−2Bt−1, where At and Bt mean Alice’s and Bob’s actions at time
t, respectively. This graph shows every possible transition among the history
profiles in the absence of the implementation errors when Alice is a TFT-
ATFT player.
Alice normally behaves as a TFT player, and this behavior is described by
the strongly connected component indicated by the green dashed rectangle in
Fig. 4(a). However, when she erroneously defects from mutual cooperation,
she switches her behavior to ATFT. The history profile jumps from cccc to
cdcc by this error, and then Alice should defect once again as an ATFT
player. If both use TFT-ATFT, they quickly recover mutual cooperation
without being exposed to the risk of exploitation via the following sequence
of history profiles: cdcc→ ddcd→ dcdd→ ccdc→ cccc.
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Figure 4: (a) History-based representation of TFT-ATFT. Each node represents a history
profile of the two previous rounds, thus the graph has 16 nodes in total. Each node has
two outgoing links because the history profile changes depending on Bob’s choice between
c and d. The green dashed rectangle shows the strongly connected component responsible
for the TFT behavior. (b) State-based representation of TFT-ATFT in which the number
of states has been reduced to four by the DFA minimization algorithm. As in Fig. 1, when
the current state is represented by a blue (red) node, the next action should be cooperation
(defection). The state changes according to the 2-tuple of actions attached to each link.
For instance, the state changes from ‘0’ to ‘1’ via cd, meaning that Alice and Bob chose
c and d, respectively, at the previous round. The four dashed rectangles in red and blue
in (a) correspond to the four nodes in (b). For instance, state ‘4’ in (b) is a super-node
formed by merging cdcc and ddcc in (a). They are 4 and 12 in binary, and we have chosen
the former one to denote the super-node. Likewise, the label of each super-node in (b) is
an arbitrary node belonging to the corresponding rectangle in (a).
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Figure 5: Two representations of one of the PS2’s for the iterated three-person PG game.
(a) History-based representation. As a memory-two strategy for a three-person game, it
has 26 = 64 nodes, each of which has four outgoing links. (b) State-based representation.
As in Fig. 4(b), the color of each node indicates which action should be chosen between c
and d at the corresponding internal state.
The DFA minimization algorithm simplifies the graph to a great extent
as shown in Fig. 4(b). It has only four internal states which we have labeled
‘4’, ‘5’, ‘0’, and ‘1’, respectively. It is the latter two, ‘0’ and ‘1’ that describe
the TFT behavior, as we have already seen in Fig. 1. When Alice erroneously
defects from mutual cooperation, on the other hand, the state jumps to ‘4’,
which belongs to the ATFT part. If both Alice and Bob are TFT-ATFT
players, they can safely recover the mutual cooperation at state ‘0’ via ‘5’.
The transition from ‘5’ to ‘0’ is crucial because Alice thereby accepts Bob’s
punishment.
3.2. Iterated three-person PG game
3.2.1. Partially successful strategies
Now, let us proceed to the iterated three-person PG game among Alice,
Bob, and Charlie. It has been proved for this game that successful strategies
are possible only when the memory length is greater than two. However,
it is instructive to begin with partially successful strategies (PS2) (Murase
and Baek, 2018), which are memory-two strategies with defensibility, distin-
guishability, and partial efficiency. By partial efficiency, we mean that the
players achieve mutual cooperation with nonzero probability < 100% in the
limit of e→ 0+. For example, TFT is partially efficient.
By enumerating all the possible memory-two strategies, whose number is
greater than one trillion, we have discovered 256 PS2’s. Figure 5 shows one
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of them before and after the minimization. The history-based representation
needs 64 nodes, which makes it difficult to interpret how the strategy works
by visual inspection [Fig. 5(a)]. On the other hand, its state-based repre-
sentation needs only 6 nodes as demonstrated in Fig. 5(b). Of course, some
variations exist among PS2’s, and the numbers of their internal states are
between 6 and 8, but their overall structures are similar.
We can interpret the nodes in Fig. 5(b), representing the internal states
of this PS2, in the following way: Suppose that Alice is using this PS2. The
node labeled ‘0’ means ‘full trust’, and Alice can expect full cooperation if
this is her internal state. If one of her co-players, say Bob, defects from full
cooperation, Alice’s state moves to ‘4’, and her strategy prescribes defection
at this state. The meaning is obvious: She distrusts Bob. Cooperation can
nevertheless be recovered if Bob chooses c whereas the other two players
punish him by d, whereby Alice’s internal state becomes ‘full trust’ again.
Another state labeled ‘1’ can be interpreted in the same way, and the only
difference is that this time it is Charlie who defects from full cooperation.
If both Bob and Charlie defect from full cooperation, Alice’s internal state
changes to ‘5’, which lies at the the bottom of Fig. 5(b). It means that she
is in despair because they may be trapped in mutual defection.
So far, we have explained how we can interpret ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘4’, and ‘5’ in
Fig. 5(b). The interesting part is the other two states labeled ‘16’ and ‘18’.
The former one, ‘16’, corresponds to At−2At−1Bt−2Bt−1Ct−2Ct−1 = cdcccc,
which is possible when Alice defects erroneously from full cooperation. She
has to choose c at this state, and she can go back to ‘0’ by accepting defection
from Bob or Charlie. In plain words, therefore, we could say that Alice wants
to make an apology at this state. Similarly to TFT-ATFT, this apology plays
an important role in maintaining mutual cooperation in a noisy environment.
Alice can also visit ‘16’ from ‘18’ with a link of dcc. It is this state ‘18’ that
makes it possible for Alice to provoke her co-players and test their naivety:
The loop between ‘16’ and ‘18’ implies that Alice can exploit Bob and Charlie
by alternating provocation (d) and apology (c) if they are unconditional
cooperators. This loop thus provides distinguishability for her PS2.
3.2.2. Fully successful strategies
By modifying the 256 PS2’s, we have reported the same number of fully
successful strategies in the memory-three strategy space (Murase and Baek,
2018). Their key difference from PS2’s is that they achieve full cooperation
with probability 100% in the limit of e → 0+. To stress the difference, we
10
cdd 0
1
ccc
9
8
66
64
ddd
ccc
ccd,cdc,
cdd
ccc,cdc
cdc
dcc
dcc
ccd
cdd
76 67
6572 ccc,ccd
cdd
cdc ccd
ddc dcd
ddcdcd
dccdcc dcd,dddddc,ddd
dcdddc
ddd ddd
dcc dcc
ddcdcd
ddd
ddc dcd
Figure 6: DFA minimization result of a fully successful strategy. The labels and the
colors are given in the same way as in Fig. 4(b).
will call them fully successful strategies (FUSS’s). The DFA minimization
process converts the FUSS’s to automata with 10 ∼ 14 internal states. One
of the simplest is depicted in Fig. 6. Its similarity to Fig. 5(b) is striking,
and we can immediately recognize the states for full trust (‘0’), despair (‘0’),
apology (‘64’), and provocation (‘66’).
At the same time, some of its features are different from the above PS2:
First, this FUSS makes Alice more careful in distrusting one of her co-players.
Recall that we have interpreted state ‘4’ as expressing Alice’s distrustfulness
of Bob. It is now split into ‘8’ and ‘76’. Due to this split, it takes one
more step to despair when one of the co-players defects. It means that the
following recovery path is possible even if Bob defects twice in a row:
0
cdc−→ 8 ddd−−→ 76 dcd−−→ 0, (2)
whereas the same sequence of actions would only lead to Alice’s distrustful-
ness of Charlie for the PS2 shown in Fig. 5(b):
0
cdc−→ 4 ddd−−→ 5 dcd−−→ 1. (3)
The second difference is the appearance of ‘72’ and ‘65’, which have no equiv-
alents in Fig. 5(b). They are transient nodes with no incoming links, which
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Figure 7: Paths for recovering mutual cooperation from one- and two-bit errors. At each
node, we have specified which history profile it represents, together with the corresponding
internal state in the state-based representation (see the node labels in Fig. 6). The label
of an internal state is written in blue (red) if c (d) is prescribed at the state. This figure
contains all the possibilities up to permutation of the players. The symbols ‘B’ and ‘C’ in
the shaded rectangles indicate who committed implementation error.
are reachable only by error. For example, node ‘72’ represents a history
profile
At−3At−2At−1 Bt−3Bt−2Bt−1 Ct−3Ct−2Ct−1 = ccd ccd ccc (4)
in binary, which means that Alice and Bob erroneously defected at the pre-
vious round.
In fact, these additional four states are needed to make this strategy
tolerant against two-bit error, which is a necessary condition for full efficiency
in this three-person game (Murase and Baek, 2018). When Alice, Bob, and
Charlie have adopted this FUSS in common, we can show that the players
recover cooperation from every possible type of one- and two-bit error by
enumerating all the possible cases:
1. Suppose that one of the FUSS players, say, Bob, committed an er-
ror. If si denotes player i’s internal state (see Fig. 6), we will have
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(sA, sB, sC) = (8, 64, 1), where Alice, Bob, and Charlie are abbreviated
to A, B, and C, respectively. It means that Bob will make an apology
(‘64’) by accepting punishment from Alice and Charlie. This recovers
cooperation as every player goes back to full trust (‘0’).
2. The FUSS can also correct two-bit error, which has three possibilities:
(a) One player, say, Bob, commits error twice in a row.
(b) Bob commits an error, and so does Charlie at the next round.
(c) Two players, say, Bob and Charlie, commit error simultaneously.
Now, we will show that all these three types of two-bit error are corrected
by the FUSS:
(a) We have already seen from Eq. (2) that this FUSS allows a recovery
path along which sA changes as 0 → 8 → 76 → 0. The question is whether
the co-players’ strategic interactions do not interrupt such a path when they
are using the same FUSS. In Fig. 7, we keep track of the other players’ states
as well, according to which (sA, sB, sC) changes as
(0, 0, 0)
cdc−−−−−−→
Bob’s error
(8, 64, 1)
ddd−−−−−−→
Bob’s error
(76, 0, 67)
dcd−−→ (0, 0, 0) (5)
for this type of two-bit error. The error is corrected.
(b) In the second case, Bob first defects in error from full cooperation.
Charlie is supposed to punish Bob by choosing d at the next round, but he
mistakenly chooses c instead. Up to this point, the players’ internal states
have evolved as (sA, sB, sC) = (0, 0, 0) → (8, 64, 1) → (66, 0, 0). Considering
that state ‘66’ has been interpreted as a decision to provoke the co-players, we
see that Charlie, after the mistaken c, appears to Alice as an unconditional
cooperator. After provoking Bob and Charlie by choosing d, Alice wants to
make an apology, and Bob and Charlie want to punish her provocation. Their
internal states thus correspond to (64, 1, 8). Understanding that Bob and
Charlie are not unconditional cooperators, Alice accepts their punishment,
whereby everyone returns to the full-trust state, i.e., (sA, sB, sC) = (0, 0, 0).
The recovery path is summarized as follows:
(0, 0, 0)
cdc−−−−−−→
Bob’s error
(8, 64, 1)
dcc−−−−−−−−→
Charlie’s error
(66, 0, 0)
dcc−→ (64, 1, 8) cdd−−→ (0, 0, 0).
(6)
(c) For the third case, we have already considered such simultaneous two-
bit error in Eq. (4). Alice falls into despair (‘9’) after Bob and Charlie’s
simultaneous defection from full cooperation, and their states are given as
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(9, 72, 65). Bob and Charlie recognize their error and decide to cooperate
due to the existence of ‘72’ and ‘65’. Alice tests them at (66, 0, 0), but we
already know that this (66, 0, 0) ends up with full trust [see Eq. (6)]. The
whole recovery path is thus given as follows:
(0, 0, 0)
cdd−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Bob and Charlie’s error
(9, 72, 65)
dcc−→ (66, 0, 0) dcc−→ (64, 1, 8) cdd−−→ (0, 0, 0).
(7)
Although c is prescribed by this FUSS at those newly added states, ‘72’
and ‘65’, it does not violate the defensibility criterion because the states are
accessible only by its player’s error, not by the co-players’ intention.
To sum up, the FUSS in Fig. 6 corrects every possible type of one- and
two-bit error and therefore exhibits full efficiency. All the recovery paths
discussed above are depicted together in Fig. 7.
4. Summary and discussion
In summary, we have investigated the working mechanism of successful
strategies for two- and three-person social dilemmas by converting them from
history-based representation to state-based one through the DFA minimiza-
tion. The state-based representation suggests how a player’s internal state
should interact with observed actions to make the strategy successful. Such
understanding has enormous importance because the essential features of
the two- and three-person cases will extend to the general n-person social
dilemma as well.
It is worth noting that state-based representation is closely related to the
idea of indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b;
Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki and
Iwasa, 2004; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006; Takeuchi
et al., 2007; Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Nax et al., 2015). Similarly to the internal
states in this work, indirect reciprocity has the notion of reputation: Alice’s
action is decided in reference to all the players’ reputations, and her reputa-
tion is updated depending on her action and the players’ previous reputations.
Such apparent similarity suggests a fascinating possibility that a successful
social norm for a game of indirect reciprocity may be constructed based on
a successful strategy for a game of direct reciprocity. This approach may be
computationally advantageous, especially if we consider that the number of
possibilities grows drastically as the number of states increases. For example,
we have found a successful strategy with 10 internal states, but it would have
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been extremely hard if we had begun with navigating the huge possibilities
of 10-state automata. This combinatorial explosion may explain the reason
that reputation has mostly been taken as a binary or trinary variable in the
literature of indirect reciprocity (Tanabe et al., 2013).
However, the similarity between states and reputations does not mean
that our state-based representation can immediately serve as a social norm in
the context of indirect reciprocity. The reason is that reputation is an external
state: It is usually understood as public information shared coherently by
all members of the society. It contrasts with the fact that any disagreement
among states in this work remains unobservable because they are internal.
This additional requirement of coherence imposes strong restrictions on the
possible form of interplay between actions and states in a game of indirect
reciprocity. Designing a successful social norm for indirect reciprocity thus
still remains as a challenging question.
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